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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether information conveyed by private equity 
placement decisions transfers to non-applying companies within the 
same industry. In particular, it investigates the impact of a company’s 
announcements of the application for, withdrawal, rejection, approval 
and completion of private equity placement, while examining the 
cross-sectional differences of the market performance of their industry 
counterparts, both in the short- and long-term. It was found that an 
intra-industry reaction exists; competitors experience a decrease in 
stock prices in response to the announcement of the application 
for, approval and completion of private equity placement and an 
increase in stock prices around the announcement of the withdrawal 
or rejection of applications. Further, it was found that competitors 
experience a decrease in their long-term stock performance following 
private placements. A higher discount on private equity placement 
is detrimental for private equity (P.E.) issuing companies in the 
long-term. This study, therefore, provides evidence of the existence 
of a contagion effect in the long-term while a competitive effect 
dominates in the short-term.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade or so, private equity placements (P.E.P.s) in public markets have shown 
tremendous growth in developed and emerging stock markets. Private equity placements in 
U.S. financial markets have recently surpassed public seasoned equity offerings (S.E.O.s) in 
terms of dollar value and the number of transactions (Chen, Dai, & Schatzberg, 2010; Wruck 
& Wu, 2009).1 In 2010, UK companies made 336 P.E.P.s, amounting to $17.9 billion, while 
Australian companies offered $9.5 billion in private equity in 593 placements. In China, 
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financing during the period from 2006 to 2010 (Abidin, Reddy, & Chen, 2012; Fonseka, 
Colombage, & Tian, 2014; Yu & Xu, 2010).2 As a result of the current financial crisis, peo-
ple believe that financial markets should be more regulated than they were previously. In 
recognition of the growing significance of P.E.P.s as a source of financing and the increasing 
financial risks, the China Securities Regulation Commission (C.S.R.C.) introduced regula-
tion in 2006 requiring companies to meet its approval criteria before making P.E.P.s. China, 
therefore, provides an example of a highly regulated market setting for private equity financ-
ing activities. Chinese P.E.P.s have some features in common with those of other countries, 
such as non-public offering to specific targets and the existence of certain lock-in periods. 
Nevertheless, there are also unique characteristics, such as various purchasing methods 
with cash or assets, regulation of lower limits on the offer price, different lock-in periods for 
different investors and C.S.R.C. administrative regulations on P.E.P.s (Lu, Li, & Wu, 2011) 
that distinguish the Chinese private equity market from the rest of the world. Abidin et al. 
(2012) argue that the new P.E.P. regulations have fewer requirements than those regulating 
public placements, which has resulted in the dramatic increase in the number of P.E.P.s 
since 2006. Hence, Chinese P.E.P.s not only affect P.E. issuing companies, but also have 
an impact on their industry peers. Gou, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) find that P.E.-backed 
companies show better market and operating performance compared to the period before 
such investments. Thus, one can argue that, if P.E.-backed companies perform better, this 
would improve their competitive position among companies in the same industry.
Stock issue announcements are motivated by managers’ desire to communicate informa-
tion about the future prospects of the company. An under-valuation of the issuing company’s 
stocks can impact other companies in the same industry (contagion effects). The contagion 
effect suggests that a P.E.P. announcement by one company positively affects the future pros-
pects of competitor companies. Therefore, investors are likely to establish a positive associ-
ation between the stock price of the company making the announcement and its industry 
competitors, and the valuation effects will spill over to competitor companies. Alternatively, 
P.E. issuing companies experience a positive stock price reaction at the expense of competi-
tor companies; thus, rivals will be negatively affected (competitive effects). The competitive 
effect implies that the information in a P.E.P. announcement changes the existing competitive 
situation and leads to wealth redistribution of competitor companies in the same industry. 
Therefore, a P.E.P. announcement by one company negatively affects competitor companies 
in the same industry. In this study, we investigate whether the C.S.R.C.’s announcement 
of P.E.P. arrangements generate a spillover effect on the returns of competitor companies.
Although P.E.P.s have increased tremendously in emerging markets recently, to the best 
of our knowledge, very few studies have explored the information transmission effect of 
P.E.P. announcements on competitor companies, even in developed markets. China is the 
second largest economy in the world and the Chinese stock market is one of the largest stock 
markets in Asia. Hence, the findings of this study are important for P.E. issuing companies, 
competitor companies, investors and regulators, because they derive from a different reg-
ulatory and institutional background and geographical context. Further, Dividend yields 
(payout ratio divided by Price-Earning (P/E) ratio) in China were very low, because rela-
tively new Chinese companies did not have stable cash dividend policies (Shao & Lin, 2004; 
Wei & Jiang, 2001). As capital gains are not taxed, Chinese investors are motivated to seek 
rapid capital gains from short-term stock dividends, leading to high share price volatility 
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(Powell, Qian, & Shi, 2013). Hence, stock price performance and the events that affect the 
stock price are important for investors. In this study, we address two research questions: 
How do the P.E.P. events such as application, approval and rejection, which are created by 
new P.E. regulations, affect stock price performance of competitor companies in both the 
short- and long-term? What is the effect of the information content of P.E.P.s on the stock 
price performance of competitor companies in both the short- and long-term?
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, according to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the information transmission effect 
of P.E.P. announcements in a highly regulated emerging market. Bo, Huang, and Wang 
(2011) pointed out that, due to the transition nature of the economy, Chinese stock mar-
kets function differently from those of major mature market economies. We describe the 
institutional and P.E. regulatory differences between the U.S. and China in detail in Section 
2. Second, we extend the prior literature of the information transmission effect of equity 
financing in the context of a highly regulated emerging market. Third, we explain the causes 
for the information transmission effect of P.E.P. events, both in the short- and long-term in 
China. One can argue that the financial market should be more regulated to overcome the 
adverse effects of the recent financial crisis. Further, one may believe that the introduction 
of regulation on the P.E.P. approval process is of particular interest to regulators in other 
countries and that China provides an excellent example of this. Our findings demonstrate 
that the highly regulated Chinese P.E. market offers large discounts due to the restrictions 
on the category and number of institutional investors and the P.E. offering price. Moreover, 
in China, the regulator has the authority to reject a P.E. application. We find that the P.E. 
discount results in a positive stock price reaction simultaneously in both the issuing and 
competitor companies, providing some evidence of the existence of the contagion effect, 
but only in the long-term. Cumming, Siegel, and Wright (2007) identified that there is a 
need for additional studies to consider ‘the effects of different institutional contexts on the 
P.E.P. and the consequent implications for the investment and performance’. Finally, we 
attempt to bridge the gap of knowledge in understanding the consequences of a P.E.P. on 
competitors’ stock price performance in different institutional backgrounds and market 
conditions, consistent with the knowledge gap identified by Cumming et al. (2007).
China began reforming its financial market in the early 2000s and integrating it into 
regional and global structures (Chan, Dang, & Yan, 2012). This study looks at P.E.P. in 
China, the world’s second largest economy and largest emerging economy in terms of gross 
domestic product (G.D.P.) and where P.E.P. is, by far, the dominant source of seasoned 
equity financing used by firms. Hence, the findings of this study are important for a large 
number of investors, researchers and policy-makers. China is an interesting test case for 
another set of reasons. Unlike in developed markets, private enforcement of investor rights 
and public enforcement of contractual disputes are neither well defined nor regulated in 
China, which relies more on an administrative governance structure to regulate the stock 
market (Pistor & Xu, 2005). Therefore, the findings of this study are useful for regulators 
and policy-makers of transitional/developing countries.
The Split Share Structure Reform in China started in 2005, which marks a major change 
in the ownership of the listed Chinese firms (e.g., Firth, Lin, & Zou, 2010; Hou, Kuo, 
& Lee, 2012). The reform abolished the split share structure (i.e., restricted state-owned 
and tradable shares), which resulted in the wealth of state shareholders being sensitive to 
share price movements and align the incentives of all shareholders (both state and private) 
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to monitor and ensure managers maximise the market value of their firms (Hou et al., 
2012). By the end of 2008, most Chinese listed firms had completed the ratification of 
their compensation payout plans, had enacted the gradual abolishment of their restricted 
shares, which became fully tradable in the stock market (Hou et al., 2012). Moreover, a 
new P.E.P.-specific regulatory regime was introduced by the C.S.R.C. in 2006, which is not 
amended to date. Therefore, findings of this study may be applicable for beyond the sample 
period and helpful for decision-making for investors, P.E. issuing and non-issuing firms 
and regulators. Especially, findings of this study help the regulator to understand the effect 
of P.E.P. regulation on P.E. non-issuing firms during the initial period, and it may provide 
some guideline on their regulation amendments in the future.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
institutional background and Chinese regulatory requirements for P.E. issuance, which is 
what motivates this empirical investigation. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature and 
develops the hypotheses tested in the study. In Section 4, we present data and the empirical 
research design, while Section 5 provides the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.
2. Review of institutional background and Chinese stock market regulations 
on P.E.P.s
Compared with developed countries, most companies in China are owned by the Chinese 
government, which greatly influences company operations and exerts enormous power in 
resource allocation and regulation enforcement (Tsai, 2008; Wu & Cheng, 2011). Sun and 
Tong (2003) demonstrate that the State ownership domination of listed companies is a sali-
ent institutional feature in China. This distinct feature, as noted by Qian, Roland, and Xu 
(1999), is the result of China’s step-by-step reform compared to the accelerated privatisation 
approach engaged by some Eastern European countries. The portion of State-owned compa-
nies or institutions accounted for ~ 70% of total shares (Zou & Xiao, 2006) prior to reform.
In 2005, the C.S.R.C. initiated share-split reform for listed companies and unfroze 
non-tradable, State-owned shares. Since the reform, publicly listed companies have relied 
primarily upon private placements to raise equity capital rather than other types of sea-
soned equity offerings for new investments. The Chinese stock market functions differently 
to those of the major market economies, due to heavy regulations (Bo et al., 2011). In 
developed markets such as the U.S., private placements are the sale of unregistered equity 
and bonds issued by a public company to a selected group of individuals or institutions. 
On the other hand, in China, the P.E.P.-specific regulatory regime was introduced by the 
C.S.R.C. in 2006, which made it mandatory for issuing companies to obtain approval from 
the regulator. This system is quite different from the self-registration P.E.P. system in other 
countries such as the U.S. Thus, the C.S.R.C. is actively involved in the P.E. issuing process 
in China; and companies that fail to comply with the regulatory conditions have their P.E.P. 
applications rejected.
According to C.S.R.C., the purposes of the P.E.P. regulations are to (i) reduce the relat-
ed-party transactions, (ii) avoid competition, (iii) enhance independence, (iv) improve 
asset quality, (v) improve financial stability and (vi) enhance the sustained profitability of 
companies. The new P.E.P. regulations are expected to ensure that non-public offerings 
554   M. M. FONSEKA ET AL.
generate legitimate benefits. Further, companies offering P.E.P.s should determine the P.E. 
issue price, reflecting the best interests of all stakeholders. Regulations also govern the 
method for determining the P.E. price as well as the category and number of institutional 
investors/block-holders in a particular P.E. issue.
In the U.S., there are no restrictions on the pricing or size of a P.E.P. and the company 
has discretion in determining the level of discount. In China, the regulations restrict the 
categories of investors who can be invited to subscribe for a P.E. issue. The regulations favour 
passive investors, while limiting the number of institutional investors in any particular 
P.E. issue. Private equity placements are offered to unlimited ‘accredited investors’ and up 
to 35 ‘sophisticated investors’ in the U.S., but in China they must be offered to the top 20 
shareholders of the company. Invitees in China should comprise: (i) not less than 20 secu-
rities investment fund management companies; (ii) not less than 10 securities companies; 
and (iii) not less than five insurance and financial institutional investors. However, P.E.P.s 
can be sold to a maximum of 10 investors who belong to any type of investor category. In 
China, the market discount for P.E.P.s typically lies above 30%, which is higher than in U.S. 
companies (Fonseka et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2011).
The primary benefits of issuing P.E. for companies are to obtain low cost capital, to build 
relationships with strategic investors and to raise much needed funds and, thereby, gain a 
competitive advantage. However, the C.S.R.C. regulations discriminate between companies 
by rejecting some P.E.P. applications. Moreover, the C.S.R.C.’s active role in regulating and 
approving P.E. issuance in China can result in a lengthy process for those companies that 
lodge an application for a P.E. issue (Yu & Xu, 2010). The P.E.P. should be concluded within 
6 months of the date of the C.S.R.C. approval.
The same as the P.E. regulation in the U.S., there is no specific regulation on the value of 
a P.E.P. in China. However, the board of directors should disclose the maximum amount 
of capital it wants to raise for the project and the P.E.P. cannot exceed the amount required 
for the project. If the Board is uncertain about the amount of capital required, companies 
should disclose the maximum amount expected to be raised from the P.E.P. In the U.S., 
investors cannot re-sell the registered private placement for at least 6 months, depend-
ing on whether or not they are affiliated with the issuer. However, the stock can be sold 
to ‘qualified institutional investors’ within a restricted period. In China, all newly-issued 
P.E.P. stocks cannot be sold within 12 months, irrespective of the category of the investor. 
If the stocks are bought by the controlling stockholder or any other company controlled 
by the real controller, they cannot be re-sold within the next 36 months. In China, P.E.P.s 
are more highly regulated than in the US. Table 1 shows the regulatory requirements for 
issuing P.E. in China.
According to the C.S.R.C.’s requirements, the decision to approve or reject an application 
should be published in prescribed mass media, as well as on the C.S.R.C.’s website. Investors 
are not fully aware of all the price sensitive information available in incomplete markets 
(Merton, 1987). As a result, there is greater uncertainty about the stocks of companies 
with lower investor recognition. Rational investors, therefore, would expect such stocks to 
have a higher discount rate. In developed countries, such as in the U.S., the media is more 
independent and competitive than in China, where the media is assumed to be under strict 
controls (Besley & Prat, 2006).
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3. Literature review and hypotheses
A substantial amount of research shows that P.E.P. announcements are associated with sig-
nificant positive returns for P.E. issuing companies. Wruck (1989), for example, finds that 
P.E. issuing companies realise statistically significant abnormal returns of 4.4% during the 
announcement period. A number of arguments have been proposed to justify this positive 
market response. Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that P.E.P.s are used by companies with 
limited financial slack to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities. Hertzel 
and Rees (1998) and Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) state that the company 
signals its financial stability to the market by issuing equity privately. They find that P.E. 
proceeds are mainly used to finance new capital expenditure projects rather than using 
them to reduce financial leverage. Further, P.E.P.s have the capability to convey special 
information. Active investors such as mutual funds or other institutional investors who 
have the resources to monitor management find private placements attractive investments. 
Private equity placements, therefore, can alter ownership concentration, which can lead to 
an improvement in monitoring. Further, the change in concentration of ownership after 
private placements reveals new information to the market, signalling an efficient allocation 
of scarce resources, which leads to positive wealth effects (Brooks & Graham, 2005; Goh, 
Gombola, Lee, & Liu, 1999).
In capital markets, the occurrence of major events at a company or the disclosure of 
operational information by it not only affects its own stock price, but also the equity prices 
of its competitors. The positive association between the abnormal returns earned by the 
announcing company and those realised by its competitors is known as the contagion effect, 
while the negative relationship is referred to as the competitive effect. Our results provide 
evidence that P.E.P. events generate competitive effect on non-P.E.P. issuing companies in the 
same industry. Szewczyk (1992) also explores whether announcements of public offerings 
of common stock elicit abnormal stock price reactions among companies within the same 
industry. He finds that average abnormal returns are significantly negative for announcing 
and non-announcing companies. This implies that investors draw inferences about the 
general prospects of the industry as a whole rather than shifts in competitive advantage 
between the announcing company and its industry rivals.
Erwin and Miller (1998) find that, depending on the nature of the announcement, the 
stock prices of non-announcing companies are positively or negatively affected following 
an announcement by one of its industry rivals. These effects result from the market revising 
its expectations about the non-announcing companies’ prospects upon the receipt of new 
information from an industry peer. The market’s revision can turn out to be accurate if the 
event occurred as the announcing company carries new information that is relevant to com-
petitive companies in the same industry (Desir, 2012). Few studies have examined whether 
equity issuing companies’ financing activities affect competitors’ returns. Akhigbe, Borde, 
and Whyte (2003) analyse the impact of initial public offerings (I.P.O.s) on rival companies 
and find that there is no significant impact on rival companies’ stock price around I.P.O. 
issuance dates. However, Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010) focus on the impact of large size 
I.P.O.s on the performance of competing companies in the same industry and find that the 
companies in the same industry experience the exact opposite outcome. Slovin, Sushka, and 
Polonchek (1992) analyse the industry-wide impact of the release of adverse information 
by investigating competitors’ stock price reactions to S.E.O.s in their industry.
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This paper observes the determinants of P.E.P. announcement information transfer and 
their spillover effects on the competitor companies. We find that an increasing number of 
P.E.P. events in a particular industry have a negative spillover effect on competitor com-
panies. Similarly, we find that a higher P.E.P. value also has a negative spillover effect on 
competitor companies. In contrast, increased P.E.P. discounts have a positive spillover effect 
on the stock prices of competitor companies. Prior studies do not adequately study the 
characteristics of P.E. deals and their spillover effects on industry counterparts in both 
developed and emerging markets. Our findings confirm that P.E. offer characteristics are 
also important determinants that affect competitor companies’ stock price performances.
Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2011) study the impacts of large P.E. investment on competing 
companies in the same industry and find that, in the U.S. and Canadian markets, compet-
itor companies are subjected to negative stock returns and abnormal stock returns in both 
the long- and short-term. The current study differs from Hsu et al. (2011) in the following 
respects: (i) in China, mandatory approval from the regulator is required for P.E.P.s, whereas 
the U.S. has a self-regulatory’ P.E.P. system (Fonseka et al., 2014); (ii) the Hsu et al. (2011) 
study sample of P.E.P.s were purchased by large P.E. investments, whereas our study covers 
the sample of P.E. financing which reflected minority ownership in target companies and 
our sample is 100% inclusive of P.E.P.s; (iii) the Chinese P.E.P. market is smaller than the 
U.S. market and has a shorter history of issuing P.E.P.s than the U.S. However, P.E.P.s have 
largely replaced traditional S.E.O.s in China due to the introduction of new P.E.P. regula-
tions, while the regulations on S.E.O.s have remained unchanged. Hence, the relatively larger 
market for P.E.P.s reflects a change in corporate ownership; (iv) we investigate the effect 
of the regulator’s announcement of a P.E.P. on the stock price performance of competitor 
companies in the short- and long-term, while the Hsu et al. (2011) study is restricted to 
P.E. investment announcements, where the regulator has no involvement in the timing of 
announcements. Therefore, it is worthwhile studying the effect of P.E.P. announcements 
on listed but non-P.E. issuing industry competitor stock prices in the context of a highly 
regulated capital market. From a methodological perspective, our article is related to the 
literature that considers the valuation effects of capital market transactions on companies 
in the same industry.
3.1. Hypotheses development
The literature provides several theoretical explanations and related empirical evidence on 
the effects of P.E.P. activity on industry competitors. The steps in the C.S.R.C. authorisation 
process involve assessment of an application for a P.E.P. and its subsequent approval or 
rejection. Some companies may withdraw the P.E.P. offer at any point between the time of 
application and approval, as well as after approval and before successful completion. It is 
also possible that some companies may not be able to successfully complete an approved 
P.E.P. Thus, all the events that include the announcement of a P.E.P. application, rejection 
or approval, and its subsequent withdrawal or completion have the potential to create an 
impact on competitors’ stock returns.
The first hypothesis relates to the initial submission of a P.E.P. application for C.S.R.C. 
approval. Since it is likely that the P.E.P. will enable the company to compete successfully 
against existing companies in the same industry, the P.E.P. application may have a negative 
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impact on rivals’ stock prices (Hsu et al., 2010, 2011). On this basis, we propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H1. The announcement of a P.E.P. application has a negative impact on the stock prices of 
competitors in the same industry.
As a P.E.P. is expected to allow the issuing company to compete more successfully against 
industry competitors, the approval of a P.E.P. may have a negative impact on competitors’ 
stock prices (this is a unique feature in China). Thus, we derive the second hypothesis:
H2. The announcement of C.S.R.C. approval of a P.E.P. has a negative effect on the stock prices 
of public listed companies in the same industry.
The successful completion of P.E.P.s provide the issuing company with the funds to invest 
in new capital expenditure projects and they can, therefore, achieve better performance 
than their industry counterparts. Hence, the successful completion of P.E.P.s may not be 
welcome news for competitor companies (Hsu et al., 2010, 2011). On this basis, we propose 
the following hypothesis:
H3. The announcement of the successful completion of a P.E.P. has a negative effect on the 
stock prices of public listed companies in the same industry.
If the application, approval or completion of a P.E.P. is not welcome news for competitors, 
then it follows that the news that an expected P.E.P. has not succeeded would be welcomed 
by competitors. A P.E.P. could be unsuccessful due to the application being rejected, with-
drawal of the application during the approval process or withdrawal of the approved P.E. 
issue prior to completion. Considering the information above, we propose:
H4. The announcement of the rejection or withdrawal of the P.E.P. application by the C.S.R.C. 
has a positive price effect on publicly traded companies in the same industry.
In theory, stock prices can move due to investors updating expectations of future cash 
flows or discount rates. Cash flow news and discount rate news of equity financing lead to 
stock price movements, those factors work as functions of the predictive variables perceived 
and cash flow and discount rate news has an important bearing on the theoretical modelling 
of asset prices (Ang & Bekaert, 2007; Chen, 2009; Chen, Da, & Priestley, 2012; Larrain & 
Yogo, 2008). Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Lu et al. (2011) use two variables 
(private placement discounts and P.E.P. proceedings) to determine the information effect 
at issuing company level. The discount reflects the ‘information price’ and the cost of the 
placement to the company (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). Chung and Hwang (2010) advocate 
that the value of information and information acquisition has a considerable impact on 
the discount level in a private placement. Hertzel and Smith (1993) used private placement 
discount to measure the information effects. They reveal that the stock price effect, based on 
the information effects, is larger for placements where the potential degree of under-valu-
ation is high. Krasker (1986) find that the size of a stock issue is negatively affected by the 
stock price. Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Fonseka et al. (2014) point out that the extent of 
information creation is subject to the economic scale of the P.E.P.s measured, using the Log 
of proceeds to measure placement size. In line with the studies of Wruck (1989) and Hertzel 
and Smith (1993), we argue that private placement discounts and the average proceeds from 
P.E.P.s at the industry level affect competitor companies. Private placement discounts and 
the value of P.E.P.s at an industry level is important information to transmit to the market. 
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This information is valuable to investors, competitors and other stakeholders in the market 
who may act on the information and might impact on competitors’ stock price performance.
Rational investors will recognise this incentive and discount their estimates of value 
unless information is made credible. This credible information leads to over-valuation of 
competitor companies, which results in a negative stock price reaction. The extent of the 
information transmission effect is also subject to economies of scale and the size of discounts 
may be smaller in the industries that have larger placements. Hence, both the information 
cost of P.E.P.s (average P.E. discount at the industry levels) and the scale of P.E.P.s (average 
proceeds from P.E.P.s at the industry levels) can also be used to test the information trans-
mission effect hypothesis, in addition to examining whether P.E.P.s exist within a particular 
industry. Based on the information above, we suggest:
H5. The scale of P.E.P.s and the number of P.E.P. events at the industry level have a negative 
price effect and the information cost of issuing companies has a positive effect on competitor 
companies in the same industry in the short-term.
Chen (2015) study the announcement of S.E.O.s and capital deductions on stock prices 
of issuing and capital deduction firms on the Taiwan Stock Market and find a positive affect 
stock price return in the long-term. One can argue that this kind of positive stock price 
return can be spillover to other firms in the same industry. Along with the arguments of 
short-term stock price effects, completion of P.E.P. should also affect the stock price per-
formance of industry rivals in the long-term. In particular, the completion of a P.E.P. is 
expected to give the P.E.P. issuing company a competitive advantage over its competitors 
and, thus, negatively affect the market performance of competitor companies in the long-
term. However, if the information cost is large (P.E.P. discount), this may have a positive 
effect on competitor companies. Based on the information above, we suggest:
H6. The scale of P.E.P.s and the number of P.E.P. events at the industry level have a negative 
price effect and the information cost of issuing companies has a positive effect on competitor 
companies in the same industry in the long-term.
4. Data and methodology
Private equity placement data were collected manually from C.S.R.C.’s monthly Bulletin for 
the period 2006–2010. We chose 2006 as the starting year because the C.S.R.C. introduced 
the regulatory constraints on P.E. in that year. The initial sample includes 518 companies 
that applied for P.E.P. (615 company-year observations)3 and 428 companies that successfully 
completed the process (488 company-year observations) companies3. Out of this initial 
sample, companies in the financial industry including foreign-listed Chinese companies 
and Chinese companies dual-listed in Hong Kong, and companies with incomplete data, 
such as where important P.E.P. event dates were missed, were excluded to generate the final 
sample to be used in our empirical analyses.
We identified companies in the same industry as the P.E.P. issuing company using 
C.S.R.C. industry classification data and defined them as competitor companies. In order 
to observe clearly the difference in the pre- and post-stock price performance of the P.E.P. 
event, we further restricted competitor companies in our sample to those that were publicly 
listed at least 2 years before the P.E.P. event year and that did not issue P.E. during our sample 
period. The final sample contains 2544 competitor company observations. Data about the 
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proceeds of P.E.P.s were obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (C. 
S.M.A.R.) seasonal equity offering database. We used the number of P.E.P. issues, average 
discount and average P.E.P. proceeds in each industry.
We employed the event study methodology to measure the market reaction of competitor 
(non-P.E.P. issuing) companies to the regulator’s announcements of P.E.P. events. For the 
purpose of generating the expected return, we first estimated the following market model:
 
Where Rit is the return on the i
th stock, Rmt is the return on the market index and Ɛit is an 
error term. This model is estimated using the daily return data for an estimation period of 
255 days that ends 45 days prior to the event day—i.e., from t-300 day to t-45 day, where 
t is the event day. The alpha and beta parameters of the model were then used to estimate 
expected returns as follows:
 
Once abnormal returns were calculated for the sample companies for a particular day, the 
average abnormal returns were calculated as follows:
 
where n is the number of sample observations on day t. The mean cumulative abnormal 
return over a given event period is the sum of the daily mean abnormal returns and is 
expressed as follows:
 
We used a cross-sectional standard deviation test to assess the significance of event window 
cumulative average abnormal returns (C.A.A.R.s).
 
where N is the number of observations, CAAR(t−l |tk) is the mean C.A.A.R.i  over the (−l |+k) 
event window and ?̂?CAAR(t−l |tk) is the event window standard deviation (Brown & Warner, 1985).
We used the following regression models to test the influence of information transmis-
sion variables related to the successfully completed P.E.P. events of (−5, 5) on the abnormal 
return:
 
(1)Rit = i + iRmt + it
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We also used the following regression analyses to determine whether information trans-
mission effects on market performance of competitors are significantly related to the suc-




where RETi,t is the annual stock return for each company i in year t. ARi,t is the annual 
abnormal return for each company i in year t. The i, j and t denote competitor companies, 
industry and time, respectively. The benchmark for abnormal returns is based on the equal 
weighted market return.
We estimated annual abnormal stock returns based on the three-factor model of Fama 
and French (1993) using the calendar-time portfolio approach. Portfolios of private place-
ments are formed daily, in calendar time. The regression model is:
 
where Ri,t is the return on portfolio i in day t, Rft is the risk free return on an average day 
t, Rmt is the return on a market index in day t, SMBt is the difference in the returns of a 
portfolio of small and big stocks in day t, HMLt is the difference in the returns of a port-
folio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks in day t and εi,t is the 
error term for portfolio i in day t. The estimate of the intercept coefficient (αi) provides an 
average abnormal return for portfolio i. S.M.B. and H.M.L. portfolios factors were obtained 
from the RESSET database and all other data were obtained from the C.S.M.A.R. market 
database. The P.E.P. Event Dummyi,t is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if year t in 
company ith belonged to industry j and there were one or more P.E.P. events, and zero oth-
erwise. The sample comprises years for companies in which each company has data from 
P.E.P. and non-P.E.P. years. The P.E.P. Event Dummy variable tests the effect of P.E.P. events 
on competitor companies’ annual returns and annual abnormal returns.
To identify the important determinants of the information transmission effects in the 
long-term, we employed the following two models:
 
where RETi,t is the annual total return for each company i in year t. ARi,t is the annual 
abnormal return for each company i in year t. The i, j and t denote competitor companies, 
industry and time, respectively. The variables, their definitions and the source of the data 
used in the regressions are summarised in Table 2.
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5. Empirical results and discussion
We analysed competitors’ short-term price reactions to P.E.P. events, the univariate change 
in their market performance before and after P.E.P.s and the cross-sectional responses to 
the number and value of P.E.P.s in their respective industry sectors. Further, we also ana-
lysed the change in competitors’ stock price performance in terms of presence (a dummy 
variable), number and value of P.E.P.s. Figure 1 shows the number and value of P.E.P.s by 
year and Figure 2 shows the number and value of P.E.P.s by industry.
These graphs show that sample P.E.P.s are relatively evenly distributed across the sample 
period. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables which used in regression both 
competitors firms and P.E. issuing firms.
5.1. Competitor companies’ short-term price reactions
Considering the impact of the information transmission effect, the prior literature calculates 
C.A.A.R. from 10 days before the event date to 10 days after the date of the event (Hsu et al., 
2010, 2011). Consistent with the literature, we chose similar time lags as our event windows. 
Table 4 shows the C.A.A.R. for different event windows, which range from 10 days before 
the event date to 10 days after the event date. C.A.A.R.s are shown for announcement of the 
application, approval or rejection, withdrawal and completion of P.E.P. events.
According to panel A of Table 4, the results report significantly negative abnormal returns 
for competitors for alternative window periods around the announcement of an application 
for a P.E.P. For example, the reported C.A.A.R.s for the (−5, 5) and (−10, 10) event windows 
are −0.50% and −0.79%, respectively. These results support hypothesis 1, which predicts 
that competitors experience negative returns around the application for a P.E.P. by their 
counterparts within the industry. Similar results are observed in respect of approval events. 











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
No of PEP Value of PEP (bn Rmb)
Figure 1. Distribution of P.E.P.s by year. Source: C.S.R.C. data, which was also used by Fonseka et al. (2014).





























































































































Value of PEP (bn Rmb)
Figure 2. Distribution of P.E.P.s by industry. Source: C.S.R.C. data, which was also used by Fonseka et al. 
(2014).
Notes: The industry classification is based on the two-digit C.S.R.C. industry codes. Industries are as follows: A01 Agriculture; 
A03 Forestry; A07 Fishery; B01 Coal mining and dressing; B05 Ferrous metal ore mining; B07 Non-ferrous metal ore mining; B50 
Mining service; C01 Food processing; C03 Foodstuff manufacturing; C05 Beverage manufacturing; C11 Textile (Cotton Mills); C13 
Cloth production (Garments); C14 Leather; C21 Wood manufacture; C25 Furniture; C31 Paper; C35 Printing; C41 Oil processing and 
refining; C47 Chemical fibres; C48 Rubber; C49 Plastic; C51 Electronics components; C55 Electrical Equipment (Appliances); C61 
Non-metal mineral products; C65 Ferrous metal foundries; C67 Non-ferrous metal foundries; C69 Metal products; C71 Common 
machines; C73 Special equipment manufacturing; C75 Traffic equipment manufacturing; C76 Electric equipment; C78 Instrument 
and office machine; C81 Medicine manufacturing; C85 Biological; D01 Utility; E01 Civil engineering construction; E05 Building 
fitting up and decoration; F03 Highway Transport; F07 Shipping; F09 Air transport; F11 Transportion subsidiary service; G81 
Communications and related equipment; G83 Computer and related equipment; G85 Communications service; G87 Computer 
application service; H01 Wholesale of food and household products; H03 Wholesale of energy, materials and equipment; H11 
Retail trade; I01 Banking; I21 Securities and futures; J01 Real estate; K34 Travel industry; K37 Healthcare and nursing service; K39 
Leasing service; L01 Publishing industry; M, Comprehensive.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of independent variables of Competitor and P.E. issuing firms.
Notes: Age represents the log value of number of operating years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the 
total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and measured by the ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the 
beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress and calculated by Altman Z-score. Beta is the systematic market risk at the 
beginning of the year and is calculated using the past 36 months of daily returns. R.O.A. is Return on Assets at the begin-
ning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value ratio at the beginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership and is a dummy 
variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 0 otherwise. H-Index is Herfindahl Index, which measures firm size in re-
lation to the industry and, thereby, indicates the amount of competition. Proceeds is the logarithm value of Private Equity 
Placement proceeds of sample issuing firms. Discount is average of discounts in the sample firms. 
Source: Authors.
Variable
Competitor firms P.E. issuing firms
Average (SD) Average (SD)
Age   13.085 (3.909)  12.611 (4.197)
Size   18.099 (1.491)  15.624 (0.992)
L.E.V.    1.016 (2.948)   1.283 (1.018)
F.D.    2.360 (3.012)   1.444 (0.739)
Beta    1.004 (0.430)   1.048 (0.156)
R.O.A.    0.421 (1.614)   0.398 (1.026)
R.O.E.    0.041 (2.432)   0.114 (0.076)
M.B.    0.896 (1.201)   2.894 (1.607)
O.W.N.-S.O.E. No. 1633 N/A 165 N/A
-Non-S.O.E. No.  911 N/A 110 N/A
H-Index    0.158 (0.089)   0.175 (0.107)
Proceeds N/A N/A  20.462 (1.019)
Discount N/A N/A   0.36 (0.758)
N 2544 275
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−0.46% in the (−5, 20) window and −0.46% in the (−10, 10) window. These results support 
hypothesis 2, suggesting that competitors experience a decrease in their stock returns around 
the approval of a P.E.P. in the same industry. The results of our estimation also support 
hypothesis 3, which predicts negative returns for competitors around the announcement 
of the successful completion of P.E.P.s. This is confirmed by the fact that the C.A.A.R. of 
−0.14% reported for the (−5, 1) window is eventually increased to −0.32% and −0.43% in the 
(−5, 10) and (−10, 10) event windows, respectively. These values have lower negative values 
compared to the results associated with the application and approval, possibly reflecting 
the fact that the market has already discounted the effects of potential completion given the 
prior knowledge of the decision to grant approval. Descriptive data shows that the successful 
approval rate of Chinese P.E.P.s is ~ 83%. However, success in approval is not guaranteed 
for P.E. issuing companies obtaining much required capital from the P.E. market for their 
future investment projects. Hence, this information conveyed by P.E.P. decisions transfers 
to competitor firms within the same industry and they show a negative stock price reaction. 
However, uncertainty at the approval stage is lower compared to at the application stage; 
we observe that the less negative stock price reaction as competitor companies know what 
the P.E. market conditions are like in China.
In contrast, consistent with hypothesis 4, competitors’ returns increase around the with-
drawal or rejection of the P.E.P. application by companies in the same industry. For the (−5, 
1) event window, competitors generated a 0.77% C.A.A.R., which is statistically significant 
at the 1% confidence level and a C.A.A.R. of 0.59% for the (−5, 5) event window, which is 
also significant at the 10% level. The C.A.A.R. for longer window periods are not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, we observed that the rejection or withdrawal of P.E.P. applica-
tions leads to an upward adjustment of competitive companies’ stock price to the level at 
which they were at prior to the issuing companies’ P.E. application. According to Panel 
B of Table 3, P.E. issuing companies have positive market reactions to their application, 
approval and successful P.E.P. event completion announcements. Rejection and withdrawal 
of P.E.P. events are associated with a negative C.A.A.R., although the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.
Application, approval and successful completion of P.E.P.s are likely to be unwelcome 
news for competitor companies and such events are associated with negative returns for 
competitors. Competitor companies’ C.A.A.R.s are significantly negative for the periods 
around the application for P.E.P.s by their counterparts in the same industry than for the 
period around the approval and completion of P.E.P.s. These results suggest that competitor 
companies react strongly to the P.E.P. applications of their rivals, given that it is the first time 
information about potential P.E.P.s is known by the market participants. According to the 
C.S.R.C., one stated objective of P.E.P. administrative regulations is to minimise competition. 
However, the above analyses show that completion of P.E.P.s have a negative effect on stock 
returns of industry competitors in the short-term. These findings are consistent with the 
prior literature based on developed markets (Hsu et al., 2010, 2011).
The successful completion of P.E.P.s provide the issuing company with the funds to invest 
in new capital expenditure projects and they can, therefore, achieve better performance than 
their industry counterparts. The successful completion of P.E.P.s is a most important event 
which contains more information for investors’ reaction that might affect competitor firms’ 
stock price movements. To investigate whether the information transmission determinants 
of P.E.P. completion events affect the competitor companies’ stock price performance in the 
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short-term, we incorporate average discounts, the log value of average P.E.P. proceeds and 
the number of P.E.P. events at industry levels as explanatory variables at the completion of 
the P.E.P. event and the regression results presented in Table 5. We include the number of 
P.E.P. events in the same industry and event window (−5, 5) in order to conduct a robust-
ness test. The results show that a 1% increase in the PEP events leads to a 0.01% decrease 
in the competitor companies’ C.A.A.R. This result supports the argument that the P.E.P. 
events have a competitive effect on non-P.E.P. issuing companies in the same industry. The 
results also show that an average market discount at the industry level is negatively signifi-
cant. A 1% increase in the average discount leads to a reduction in competitor companies’ 
short-term C.A.A.R. by 0.02%. The value of P.E.P. proceeds is also a statistically significant 
negative value, suggesting that an increase of 1% in the natural log value of average proceeds 
received from a P.E.P. leads to a decrease in the competitor companies’ C.A.A.R. by 0.01%. 
Further, these findings reveal that the information transmission of a P.E.P. negatively affects 
competitor companies’ stock price performance in the short-term. In addition, the market 
Table 5.  The information transmission effects of Private Equity Placements on Industry Competitors’ 
C.A.A.R.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered with industries and time are in parentheses. C.A.A.R. is Cumulated Average Abnor-
mal Return in (−5, 5) event window used as dependent variable. Age represents the log value of number of operating 
years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and measured by the 
ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress and calculated 
by Altman Z-score. Beta is the systematic market risk at the beginning of the year and is calculated using past 36 months 
of daily returns. R.O.A. is Return on Assets at the beginning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value ratio at the be-
ginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership and is a dummy variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 0 otherwise. 
H-Index is Herfindahl Index, which measures firm size in relation to the industry and, thereby, indicates the amount of 
competition. N_P.E.P.s is the logarithm of number of private equity placements of the industry. V_P.E.P.s is the logarithm 
value of Private Equity Placement proceeds in the industry. Dis_P.E.P.s is average of discounts in a particular industry level.
***Significance at 1%; **Significance at 5%; *Significance at 10%. 
Source: Authors. 
Control Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Variables C.A.A.R. C.A.A.R. C.A.A.R. C.A.A.R.
Constant   −0.428***   −0.220   −0.212   −0.284***
(0.109) (0.153) (0.144) (0.110)
Age   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size     0.013***    0.010**    0.010***    0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
L.E.V.     0.001***    0.001***    0.001***    0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F.D.     0.001**    0.001**    0.001***    0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Beta   −0.001   −0.001   −0.005   −0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
R.O.A.   −0.003   −0.008   −0.003*   −0.006
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009)
M.B.V.   −0.001***   −0.001***   −0.001***   −0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
O.W.N.     0.002   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
H-Index   −0.006**   −0.004**   −0.004*   −0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N_P.E.P.s   −0.008***
(0.008)
V_P.E.P.s   −0.011***
(0.009)
Dis_P.E.P.s   −0.016***
(0.018)
N 2544 2544 2544 2544
Adj. R2    0.041    0.045    0.046    0.047
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discount and the value of P.E.P. proceeds is the most important information that transfers 
to competitors companies from P.E. issuing companies.
5.2. Competitor companies’ long-term stock price performance
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables included in the regression 
analyses. Significant and negative correlations exist between P.E.P. events and stock returns/
abnormal returns and between P.E.P. proceeds and stock returns/abnormal returns, while 
significant and positive correlations are reported between P.E. discounts and stock returns/
abnormal returns of competitor companies, which provides some preliminary evidence for 
the relationship mentioned in hypotheses 5 and 6.
We also attempt to explain the negative long-term market performance of competitor 
companies in the years in which P.E.P.s were completed by their industry rivals. This is 
accomplished by relating competitors’ annual returns or annual abnormal returns to a 
P.E.P. event dummy variable after controlling for the number of factors that are known to 
have impacted on the long-term stock price performance.4 The results are shown in Table 7. 
Models 1 and 3 show the relationship between the long-term stock returns and control 
variables. Consistent with hypothesis 6, a P.E.P. event is negatively related to competitors’ 
stock price performances. In particular, the estimates for Model 2 show a statistically signif-
icant 0.032% decrease in stock returns associated with the P.E.P. event. Similarly, estimates 
for Model 4 show a significant −0.03% decrease in abnormal stock returns associated with 
the P.E.P. event. According to the Table in Appendix A, a P.E.P. event has a positive effect 
on annual stock and abnormal stock returns of P.E. issuing companies.5 The significant 
coefficients, outlined above, generated in our estimation confirm that P.E.P. events have a 
competitive effect on the share prices of intra-industry counterparts.
Based on Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), we argue that discounts and 
proceeds from P.E.P.s measure information effects and that stock price effects are based on 
the implication that the information effects are larger for placements where the potential 
degree of under-valuation is high. The discounts and proceeds from P.E.P.s at industry level 
transmit to the investors, competitors and other stakeholders in the market who react on 
this information. To strengthen our argument, we also assess whether the size of the P.E.P. 
event, as measured by the average value of P.E.P. events in a given year, is related to com-
petitors’ long-term stock price performance. The results provided in Table 8 show that the 
value of P.E.P.s is significantly negatively related to competitor companies’ stock returns and 
abnormal returns. In particular, stock returns and abnormal stock returns show a signifi-
cant 0.01% and 0.006% decrease associated with the average value of P.E.P.s at the industry 
level. A P.E.P. discount at the industry level is significantly positive and stock returns and 
abnormal stock returns show a significant 0.05% and 0.014% increase associated with the 
P.E.P. discount at industry level.
Furthermore, our results show that the C.S.R.C.’s announcement of P.E.P. arrangements 
generates a spillover effect on the stock returns of industry competitors in China. In gen-
eral, this information transmission effect of P.E.P. announcements can be categorised into 
contagion and competitive effects. As revealed in our results, the information in a P.E.P. 
announcement changes the original competitive situation and leads to the short-term wealth 
redistribution of competitor companies in the same industry. Thus, we confirm that P.E.P. 
announcements have competitive effects in the short-term. The results of 9 also show that 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































570   M. M. FONSEKA ET AL.
P.E.P. events are negatively correlated with stock returns in the long-term, while suggesting 
the presence of competitive effects that are driven by the negative association between the 
stock return of the issuing firms and its industry competitors.
6. Conclusions
Private placements are becoming a popular means of secondary equity offering among 
companies operating across different international capital markets, regardless of the stage 
of development of the market. This paper provides empirical evidence of the effect of P.E.P.s 
on competitors’ stock price using data from the highly transitional and regulated Chinese 
market. We find that competitors experience a decrease in stock prices in response to the 
announcements of application, approval and completion of P.E.P. events and an increase in 
stock prices around the announcements of withdrawal or rejection of P.E.P. events. Further, 
Table 7. The effects of information transmission of successfully completed P.E.P. events on industry com-
petitors’ long-term return.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered with industries and time are in parentheses. R.E.T. and A.R. are annual stock returns 
and abnormal stock returns, respectively, and used as dependent variables. Age represents the log value of number of 
operating years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and meas-
ured by the ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress 
and calculated by Altman Z-score. Beta is the systematic market risk at the beginning of the year and it is calculated using 
the past 36 months of daily returns. R.O.A. is return on assets at the beginning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value 
ratio at the beginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership and is a dummy variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 
0 otherwise. H-Index is Herfindahl Index, which measures firm size in relation to the industry and, thereby, indicates the 
amount of competition. P.E.P._E is Private Equity Placement (P.E.P.) Event; 1 if P.E.P. event in the industry, otherwise 0.
***Significance at 1%; **Significance at 5%; *Significance at 10%. 
Source: Authors.  
Dependent variable:
Control (1) Model (4) Control (2) Model (5)
R.E.T. R.E.T. A.R. A.R.
Constant    2.862***    2.863***    1.441***    1.451***
(0.315) (0.324) (0.316) (0.319)
Age    0.021    0.034    0.020    0.029
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Size   −0.060***   −0.061***   −0.060***   −0.059***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
L.E.V.    0.001**    0.001**    0.001**    0.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F.D.    0.001***    0.001***    0.001***    0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beta    0.063**    0.109**    0.063**    0.065**
(0.032) (0.046) (0.032) (0.033)
R.O.A.   −0.001***   −0.001***   −0.001***   −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M.B.V.   −0.001*   −0.001   −0.001*   −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
O.W.N.   −0.032   −0.028   −0.032   −0.028
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Lagged dependent variable   −0.089***   −0.090***   −0.092***   −0.092***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
H-Index    0.083***    0.085***    0.083***     0.082***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
P.E.P._ E   −0.032**   −0.038**
(0.022) (0.022)
N 2539 2539 2539 2539
Adj. R2    0.596    0.603    0.063    0.066
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competitors experience a decrease in their long-term stock performance following P.E.P. 
events, suggesting the existence of a competitive effect both in the short- and the long-
term. Hence, the outcome of our analysis confirms that information associated with a P.E.P. 
announcement changes the original competitive situation and leads to the short- and long-
term wealth redistribution of competitor companies within the same industry. Moreover, 
the short-term effect of discounts on P.E.P.s on a competitor company’s C.A.A.R. is negative. 
However, the short-term effect of discounts on P.E.P.s positively affects the long-term stock 
returns and abnormal stock returns of competitor companies. Chinese companies place 
P.E. at a higher discount than U.S. companies (Fonseka et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2011). In the 
context of information spillover, the competitive effect dominates the contagion effect. 
Offering higher discounts on P.E.P.s assists issuing companies to raise the required amount 
of funds for their potential investment projects in the short-term. In addition, industry 
Table 8. The effects of detailed information transmission of successfully completed P.E.P. events on in-
dustry competitors’ long-term return.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered with industries and times are in parentheses. R.E.T. and A.R. are annual stock returns 
and abnormal stock returns, respectively, used as dependent variables. Age represents the log value of number of oper-
ating years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and measured 
by the ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress and 
calculated by Altman Z-score. Beta is the systematic market risk at the beginning of the year and it is calculated using 
the past 36 months of daily returns. R.O.A. is Return on Assets at the beginning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value 
ratio at the beginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership and is a dummy variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 
0 otherwise. H-Index is Herfindahl Index, which measures firm size in relation to the industry and thereby indicates the 
amount of competition. Dis_P.E.P.s is the average value of discounts in a particular industry level. V_P.E.P.s is the logarithm 
value of Private Equity Placement proceeds in the industry.
***Significance at 1%; **Significance at 5%; *Significance at 10%. 
Source: Authors.  
Variables
Control (3) Model (6) Model(7) Control (4) Model (8) Model (9)
R.E.T. R.E.T. R.E.T. A.R. A.R. A.R.
Constant    2.658***    2.824***    2.540**    3.080***    3.239***    3.001***
(0.889) (0.936) (1.033) (0.869) (0.916) (1.019)
Age    0.003    0.002    0.003    0.003    0.002    0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Size   −0.169***   −0.177***   −0.156***   −0.169***   −0.177***   −0.156***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.028)
L.E.V.    0.006*    0.006*    0.005*    0.006*    0.006*    0.005**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
F.D.    0.004***    0.009***    0.004***    0.001***    0.002*    0.004***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Beta    0.089    0.084    0.102    0.087    0.081    0.100
(0.099) (0.108) (0.092) (0.099) (0.108) (0.092)
R.O.A.   −0.017   −0.013   −0.017   −0.023+   −0.016   −0.023+
(0.012) (0.064) (0.011) (0.012) (0.064) (0.012)
M.B.   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001   −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
O.W.N.   −0.059   −0.055   −0.053   −0.060   −0.056   −0.053
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037)
Lag dependent variable   −0.087***   −0.094***   −0.084***   −0.087***   −0.094***   −0.084***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
H-Index    0.083***    0.087***    0.082***   0.083***    0.087***    0.082***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Dis_P.E.P.s    0.051**    0.014**
(0.079) (0.021)
V_P.E.P.s   −0.009***   −0.006***
(0.013) (0.011)
N 2539 2539 2539 2539 2539 2539
Adj. R2    0.596    0.583    0.619    0.063    0.065    0.067
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level discounts also have a positive impact on the stock price performance of their industry 
counterparts in the long-term.
Notes
1.  The total dollar amount of private equity investments in public listed firms increased from 
$2 billion to $88 billion in the period 1995–2006, whereas the total dollar amount of S.E.O.s 
in 2006 was $76 billion.
2.  In the U.S., P.E.P.s reflect minority ownership stakes in target firms unless they represent a 
full buyout. On the other hand, average Chinese P.E.P.s are relatively larger and regulations 
on private equity (P.E.) attract large institutional buyers (see Section 2). Hence, we were 
compelled to restrict our analysis to placements by issuing firms and their spillover effects 
on competitor firms.
3.  According to C.S.R.C. regulation, a company that obtained approval should complete the 
P.E.P. within 6 months. On average, sample companies took 2 months to complete their 
Table 9. The information effects of successfully completed P.E.P. on .P.E.P issuing firms in long-term re-
turns.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firms and time are in parentheses. R.E.T. and A.R. are annual stock returns and 
abnormal stock returns, respectively, used as dependent variables. Age represents the log value of number of operating 
years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and measured by the 
ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress and calculat-
ed by Altman Z-score. Beta is the systematic market risk at the beginning of the year and it is calculated using the past 
36 months of daily returns. R.O.A. is Return on Assets at the beginning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value ratio 
at the beginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership, which is a dummy variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 0 
otherwise. Discount is the market discount of private equity placement and it is computed by (Closing Price of 10th day 
after announcement - Placement Price)/Closing Price of 10th day after announcement. Proceeds is the logarithm value 
of Private Equity Placement.
***Significance at 1%; **Significance at 5%; *Significance at 10%. 
Source: Authors. 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RET RET RET AR AR AR
Constant   1.826   1.420   0.949   1.394   1.004   0.512
(1.366) (1.381) (1.403) (1.381) (1.382) (1.424)
Age   0.019   0.016   0.013   0.018   0.015   0.012
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Size  −0.033  −0.018  −0.113  −0.033  −0.017  −0.114
(0.059) (0.0591) (0.082) (0.060) (0.059) (0.082)
L.E.V.  −0.200*  −0.193*  −0.191*  −0.201*  −0.194*  −0.192*
(0.163) (0.157) (0.164) (0.163) (0.157) (0.164)
F.D.   0.0015*   0.010*   0.016**   0.003**   0.011**   0.0151**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Beta   0.219   0.185   0.242    0.215   0.182   0.238
(0.318) (0.313) (0.314) (0.318) (0.314) (0.315)
R.O.A.   0.195***   0.028**   0.242***   0.229***   0.060***   0.275***
(0.048) (0.012) (0.047) (0.042) (0.015) (0.045)
M.B.V.   0.002  −0.002  −0.004   0.003  −0.001  −0.004
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
O.W.N.   0.076   0.084   0.070   0.074   0.081   0.068
(0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.138)
Lag dependent variable  −0.003  −0.013  −0.008  −0.005  −0.016  −0.010
(0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.055)
Discount   0.053***   0.049***
(0.031) (0.002)
Proceeds   0.134**   0.034**
(0.089) (0.009)
N 275 275 275 275 275 275
Adj. R2   0.501   0.505   0.503   0.062   0.070   0.066
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P.E.P.s. Hence, application, approval/rejection announcement events were not contaminated 
(clustered) by time (event windows).
4.  Correlation matrix and VIF factors suggested that there is no multicollinearity problem.
5.  P.E. issuing firm-year observations and their corresponding non-P.E. issuing observations 
were selected for P.E.P. firms. We created dummy variable for measuring P.E.P. events (if a 
firm has issued P.E. the variable is 1 and if the firm did not issue P.E. for the rest of the period 
that is indicated as 0).
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Appendix A: Effects of successfully completed PE event on PE issuing firms in long 
term returns.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
R.E.T. R.E.T. A.R. A.R.
Constant   0.726   0.720   0.794   0.804 
(0.965) (0.981) (0.991) (1.052)
Age   0.016   0.013   0.015   0.012
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Size  −0.028  −0.012  −0.027  −0.014
(0.068) (0.069) (0.067) (0.064)
L.E.V.  −0.188**  −0.173*  −0.189*  −0.174*
(0.123) (0.116) (0.123) (0.118)
F.D.   0.0005***   0.005***   0.002***   0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
B.E.T.A.   0.119   0.085   0.115   0.082
(0.206) (0.201) (0.204) (0.201)
R.O.A.   0.095***   0.008**   0.029***   0.006***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
M.B.V.   0.012  −0.007   0.003  −0.001
(0.045) (0.044) (0.018) (0.12)
O.W.N.   0.051   0.063   0.052   0.061
(0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099)
Lag dependent variable  −0.003  −0.006  −0.002  −0.008
(0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.033)
P.E.P._E1   0.033***   0.039***
(0.017) (0.014)
N 756 756 756 756
Adj. R2   0.301   0.315   0.042   0.052
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered with industries and time are in parentheses. R.E.T. and A.R. are annual stock returns 
and abnormal stock returns, respectively, and used as dependent variables. Age represents the log value of number of 
operating years from establishment. Size is measured by the log of the total assets. L.E.V. is financial leverage and meas-
ured by the ratio of interest bearing liability to equity in each firm at the beginning of the year. F.D. is financial distress 
and calculated by Altman Z-score. B.E.T.A. is the systematic market risk at the beginning of the year and it is calculated 
using past 36 months of daily returns. R.O.A. is return on assets at the beginning of the year. M.B.V. is Market to book value 
ratio at the beginning of the year. O.W.N. is ownership and is a dummy variable; 1 if controlling shareholder is State and 0 
otherwise. P.E.P._E1 is Private Equity Placement (P.E.P.) event; if a firm has issued P.E. it is 1 and if the firm did not issue P.E. 
for the rest of the period it is 0.
*** Significance at 1%; ** Significance at 5%; * Significance at 10%.
Source: Authors.
